Here's the Nemo of the society - trying to join the dots - Bharat's successful Shakti (ASAT) mission and the recent decision of Mauritius satellite tracking centre...

Sabkuch dikhta nahi hai ... Not everything is visible... As an avid reader, we must try to join the dots...

So... here we go...

Remember, Modi sir's speech in 2019 after successful Mission Shakti?

watch here...

Key Facts

1. Mission Shakti (India’s ASAT test, 2019):

   • On 27 March 2019, India (DRDO) destroyed one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit via a kinetic interceptor. 

   • It was done at a relatively low altitude (~282 km) to limit long‐lived debris.

   • The test had both technical and strategic significance: demonstrating capability, signaling deterrence, and making clearer India’s interest in space situational awareness (SSA) and satellite security.

2. India‑Mauritius Satellite Tracking / Telemetry, Tracking, and Telecommand (TT&C) Station:

   • Very recently, India and Mauritius signed a Memorandum of Understanding to set up a satellite tracking station in Mauritius, covering telemetry, tracking, and telecommand for satellites and launch vehicles. 

   • The purpose is non‑military (on paper), for space research, science, applications, etc. But it will improve India’s ability to monitor and manage its satellite assets, especially those in the Indian Ocean region. 

   • The facility will help receive data, send commands, monitor satellite health, track orbit, etc. 

How They Are Connected...

The connection between the ASAT test and the tracking station shows up in a few dimensions:

1. Need for Space Situational Awareness (SSA):

   • After carrying out ASAT, or in a strategic environment where anti‑satellite threats exist (whether from others or potential escalation), being able to see, track, monitor, and predict what satellites—including potentially hostile or damaged ones—are doing becomes very important. The ASAT test showed that space is contested, or at least that India wants to position itself as having deterrent capabilities. To make deterrence credible, you need monitoring/observation infrastructure.

   • A ground station in Mauritius helps India cover parts of the sky (especially over the Indian Ocean) that otherwise might have gaps in tracking or coverage from ground stations in India. Better coverage means better SSA, which in turn sharpens both defensive and deterrent capabilities (e.g. detect unusual or hostile satellite behavior; respond, etc.).

2. Operational Support for Satellite Control / Responsiveness:

   • Satellites (and launch vehicles) need ground stations for tracking, telemetry, commands. A closer or more distributed network of TT&C facilities allows more timely response in case of anomaly, damage, or threat.

   • In military terms, when one has ASAT capability, the other side might try to degrade or interfere with one’s satellites. Being able to quickly detect, diagnose, restore or re‑route around those effects depends on having resilient command, tracking and telemetry infrastructure.

3. Geopolitical / Strategic Depth in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR):

   • The Indian Ocean has become a focus region for strategic competition. Having infrastructure in Mauritius gives India strategic depth in the IOR—not only for "civil" satellites but also with dual‑use implications (i.e. facilities may help track foreign satellites or space debris of concern, or respond to threats).

   • It also aligns with India’s maritime/security/diplomatic goals in the region. Cooperation with Mauritius strengthens India’s presence and ability to project or monitor in the region. India’s “Mahāsāgar” vision, “Neighbourhood First” etc. policies tie into these strategic ambitions.

4. Deterrence Credibility:

   • Showing that one has ASAT means being able to threaten or counter adversaries in space. But that threat is more persuasive if the adversary knows you can detect their satellites (or threats), know their orbital path, see when something anomalous happens, etc. A good SSA network undercuts surprise, supports attribution, and thus enhances deterrence.

   • Also, if something happens to India’s satellite (say an attack or collision, etc.), having the tracking station means India can better document and assess the damage or cause, which can matter diplomatically or for escalation decisions.

What Is Not (Yet) Clear...

While the above linkages are logical, some matters are not yet fully known or confirmed; they rest on inference rather than public statements.

1. Extent of Military Use / Dual‑Use:

   • The TT&C station is officially for civil and scientific use, but such infrastructure is inherently dual‑use (civil/military). There is no public confirmation yet that it will be explicitly used for tracking adversarial satellites, missile warning, or counterspace operations.

   • How closely this facility will be integrated into India’s defence or space security architecture (e.g. with its SSA networks, Defence Space Agency, etc.) is not yet confirmed.

2. Technical Capabilities:

   • We don’t (publicly) have full details of the antenna sizes, sensitivities, coverage, whether the station can do optical, radar, or only radio telemetry/tracking, whether it will help track small debris, etc. This limits how capable the facility will be in supporting advanced SSA.

   • Also, how continuous will be its coverage; how much overlap with other Indian stations is there; what latencies; what secure communication; etc.

3. Policy / Doctrine Links:

   • Whether this specific station is explicitly tied into doctrine developed post‑ASAT (for example, specific roles in deterrence, threat detection, response, attribution) isn’t clear in open sources.

   • The legal, diplomatic, and strategic rules around India using such stations in case of conflict or threat are likely still being worked out behind the scenes.

4. Reaction by Other Powers / Risks of Countermeasures:

   • Building more tracking stations increases capabilities but could also be seen by others (e.g. China, maybe even the US or others) as increasing India’s space control / surveillance capacity. That can raise tensions. But so far, these concerns seem known and factored in diplomatically.

   • There might be diplomatic / diplomatic/security trade‑offs (e.g., sovereignty, data sharing, security of the infrastructure, vulnerability of the facility itself, etc.).

Overall Assessment

Putting it all together, the Mauritius satellite tracking station is very likely part of India's broader strategy post‑ASAT to build a more resilient, distributed, capable space infrastructure. It helps in bolstering space situational awareness, improving command and control of satellites, enhancing early warning or tracking of threats or anomalies, and thus reinforcing deterrence.

In short, ASAT was a capability demonstration; the new tracking station is part of the enabling infrastructure: it's less flashy, but essential, if India wants to make its deterrence credible, protect its own space assets, and possibly deter or counter hostile space operations in the Indian Ocean / North Hemisphere region.